Greg Detre
1/10/01
just punishment and moral condemnation � moral responsibility � freedom � falsity of determinism
2 different meanings � the pessimist/incompatibilist is looking for a genuinely free identification of the will with the act, beyond the negative freedoms (e.g. compulsion, innate incapacity, insanity, ignorance, mistake, accident, circumstances, leaving no real option) or its positive side (I know what I�m doing, intend it, not just rationalise it etc.)
considers special circumstances under which our normal inter-personal feelings towards an agent as a result of some act are affected:
1)�� he didn't meant to/didn't know
������������ couldn't help/no alternative
������ here we still see the agent as a fully responsible agent, but we see teh *injury* as one for which he is not fully responsible in some way
2��� a)�� *he wasn't himself*/been under great strain recently
������ b)�� he's only a child/hopeless schizophrenic/his mind has been systematically perverted
������������ group 2 invites us to see the agent himself in a different light, as opposed to just a particular action
������ 2b considers normal circumstances but an abnormal or morally underdeveloped agent
here, we don't get involved or participate with them in the same way - we take an objective attitude to them
interestingly we can suspend our participant attitude and take the objective attitude, even in normal circumstances
so how does the thesis of determinism affect our reactive attitudes?
does determinism force us to take the objective atittude towards absolutely everyone?
for starters, humans are not capable of taking this stance purely on the basis of a theoretical conclusion
secondly, in the cases where we do take the objective attitude towards someone psychologically abnormal, it is not because we consider determinism to be at work there, but rather that we�ve chosen to suspend normal inter-personal relationships with them for whatever reason
i.e. our commitment to the participant reactive attitude as a general framework is not suspendable, even when considering what it would be rational for us to do if we accepted the determinism thesis and, even if had this choice it would have no bearing on the rationality of our lives in choosing what will enrich/impoverish them
now consider these reactive attitudes (reactions to the quality of others� wills to us, as manifested in their behaviour) as moral when they are felt on behalf of someone else (i.e. resentment � indgnation/disapproval), i.e. as we now think of all men
he shows that we can take the same view of acts that would make us resentful or grateful or whatever if done to us, when done to others
we can hold the agent morally responsible but excuse that particular, or we can exempt him from all moral responsibility entirely (the objective attitude)
he is arguing that even if someone were to prove that we live in a deterministic world, then it doesn't matter at all what the �rational� way to act would be, since we�re constitutionally incapabale of taking the objective attitude towards everyone
he seems to go on to say that even if we were capable it wouldn't matter anywhere
Strawson is reconciling the disagreement between optimist + pessimist (about the implications of the determinist thesis) by saying that until now the optimist had concentrated on pointing out the social utility of punishment, moral condemnation etc. without considering the attitudes and feeling that accompany moral acts, i.e. as though treating everyone as taking the objective attitude
lacuna
La Rochefoucald � self-love � esteem, contempt � central
human vs self-respect/dignity vs need to be loved
gerundive
surely the post-hypnotic suggestion is 2b???
no
Strawson seems to be briefly considering the interesting question of what it would be rational to do for an agent with free will trapped in an otherwise deterministic world
what is Strawson hoping to prove by showing that the objective attitude is not (and is nothing like) a deterministic attitude???
let�s say I�m an epiphenomenalist � can't that be compatible with free will if one is prepared to say that my self resides in the neurons, not in the illusory phenomenological self
is there no way to invent a 3rd group to fit determinism into???
I don't see how, because determinism if it�s problematic is problematic exactly because it detracts from the moral responsibility of the agent himself and yet Strawson is right in saying that we don't corrrelate it with the second group of morally/psychologically infirm to whom we take the objective attitude
how did he show that determinism doesn't fall into 2nd group???
surely the pessimist is complaining not that the feelings + attitudes are being omitted by the optimist, but the causes + justifications for those feelings, which stem from a counterfactual � so determinism is in the 2nd group???
contra-causal freedom???
how does Strawson think that the falsity of determinism would affect the rationality of our actions???
surely the determinist thesis is coherent � it�s the non-determinist thesis which is unintelligible???
what modifications would we actually then make to the optimist�s view to make it work???